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The importance of the physician-patient relationship for the health care market is beyond 
controversy. Recent work emphasizes a two-sided asymmetric information relationship 
between physician and patient. In contrast to most work looking only at the physician's 
perspective, our paper concentrates on the patient's view. Estimation results support the 
hypotheses that physician consultation and health relevant behavior are not stochastically 
independent. In the recursive bivariate probit model, patient’s health relevant behavior has a 
significant influence on the probability of a physician visit. This means that health care 
demand and not only the contact decision is determined by both, patient and physician.  
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 1  Introduction 
In the political discussion about reforming the health care sector in Germany and especially 
the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) the focus is on health expenditures and financing health 
care. In detail, this corresponds to questions concerning the dynamics of expenditures and the 
slackness of revenues raised as percentage of wage income. Proposals that focus on the 
relationship between physician and patient play an underpart in the debate about the future 
design of the health care system. In the last years, regulation has taken place in the benefits 
catalogue and levels of coinsurance but not in the physician-patient relationship. In contrast to 
health politics, the advisory council for the health care system has stressed the importance of 
patient’s personal responsibility (cf. Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health 
Care (2001)). In fact, the responsibility is often misconceived as only financial participation 
of the patient on his health care expenditures. 
The patient’s special attitude in his relation to the physician can be described by the keyword 
patient orientation (cf. Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health Care (2003), 
p.  38). Compared to other parts of the service sector, the health care sector has some 
characteristics that prevent a better patient orientation. On the one hand, 99 % of the patients 
demand for medical services is based on their status as insured persons. Therefore, it is not 
possible to speak of free consumption because of the regulations of this market. On the other 
hand, asymmetric information is prevalent in the physician-patient relationship. Moreover, the 
medical services can be classified as experience goods, so that the patient’s role in the health 
production is one of a “co-producer of health care” (Advisory Council for the Concerted 
Action in Health Care (2003), p. 40).
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From a theoretical point of view, patient’s influence on the physician-patient relationship can 
be analyzed from the perspective of economics of information. Most of the theoretical models 
in this field are based on the physician’s behavior whereas the patient’s health related 
behavior is neglected. Our paper emphasizes the patient’s view of the physician-patient 
relationship. Therefore, we focus on models that incorporate explicitly the patient’s health 
related behavior. It is important to keep in mind that the term health related behavior has a 
broader meaning than the term compliance, which indicates the patient’s complimentary 
treatment behavior. From an empirical perspective, especially the analysis of the determinants 
                                                 
1 In many cases, the services supplied can be denoted as confidence goods because the patient is not able to 
monitor their quality ex post. 
  1of patient’s behavior as well as the determination of factors influencing the relationship 
between a patient and his physician are at the center of interest. 
The paper is organized as follows: The second chapter discusses the German health care 
system and presents some theoretical models of the physician-patient relationship that deal 
explicitly with the patient’s behavior. With the results of these models in mind testable 
hypotheses about patient’s behavior are developed. The econometric techniques and the data 
used are presented in the third part of the paper. The determinants of individual health 
relevant behavior and physician consultation are investigated using a bivariate probit model 
for panel data. The fourth chapter presents and discusses the obtained results. The paper ends 
with a conclusion.  
2  The relationship between physician and patient and the market for 
health care services in Germany: some theoretical background 
The German health care system is characterized by a Statutory Health Insurance system (SHI) 
with competing sickness funds and a private/ public mix of providers. Recently, around 90 % 
of the population is covered by comprehensive SHI. In addition, approximately 9 % have a 
private health insurance including insured in governmental schemes and only 0.2% of the 
population is not covered by any third-party payer scheme (Busse and Riesberg (2004)). 
Ambulatory health care is mainly delivered by private for-profit providers working in single 
practice. Since 2004, sickness funds have been obliged to offer gate-keeping models to their 
insured up to now on a voluntarily basis (disease management programs, integrated health 
care). Patients have free choice of services, including dental, mental, and emergency services. 
SHI-affiliated physicians offer almost all medical specialties in ambulatory care. A user 
charge of 10 Euro for the first physician contact per quarter and any further non-referred visit 
has been introduced to raise funding and reduce unnecessary visits.  
The physicians are members of regional associations of SHI-accredited physicians. They are 
obliged to secure the provision of ambulatory care in their particular region. Regional 
physicians’ associations negotiate contracts for ambulatory services collectively for all SHI-
affiliated physicians in their region on an annual basis. Sickness funds transfer fixed per-
capita amounts according to the number of SHI-insured living in the region, which results in 
de facto budgets for ambulatory physician services. The regional physicians’ associations 
divide the financial resources in separate funds for general practitioners and specialists and 
distribute the resources among their members according to the nationally uniform scale of 
  2relative point values and regionally adapted rules. Limitations of service volumes apply by 
specialty and age structure of the patients treated. They are controlled for and sanctioned by 
regional physicians’ associations or joint committees with sickness funds. In turn, they 
traditionally have a monopoly to provide ambulatory primary and secondary care and 
negotiate collective contracts with the various sickness funds. 
The problems of the German health care system resulting from these points can be 
characterized by inefficient incentive structures, quality problems, and organizational deficits. 
The German Advisory Council of Economic Experts states that the main incentive problems 
in the health care system are present in the physician-patient relationship and focuses on the 
question of health care demand. In this context, the decision whether a discomfort can be 
regarded as an illness or not depends on each person’s own discretionary power. The more 
liberally the choice of the physician is organized and the lower the costs the patient has to 
bear, the higher is the probability of a physician consultation even in the case of a small 
discomfort. Moreover, in case of a consultation, the physician determines not only the illness 
diagnosis but also, because of his medical knowledge, the relevant therapy, and therefore the 
patient’s demand for medical services. Potential excessive supply behavior is facilitated 
because the possibility to control the supplied medical services as well as the treatment 
quality is limited up to now. In addition, the excessive demand behavior of the patient 
benefits from the lack of cost transparency concerning the level and the distribution of the 
treatment costs. Finally, the predominant non-constrained and non-coordinated choice of 
physicians leads to duplicate or multiple examinations and results in a rise in health care 
expenditures because of not coordinated parallel treatments. 
These stylized facts of the German health care system can be related to the international 
discussion of health care demand that can be divided into two categories. One line focuses on 
the physician-inducement hypothesis while the second line highlights patient’s moral hazard 
behavior.
2 The common feature of both types of models is the problem of asymmetric 
information prevalent in the health care sector. 
In more detail, as the physician usually performs both, diagnosis and therapy, he has a 
discretionary scope concerning his decisions (cf. Arrow (1963), p. 949). As a result, it is 
possible that the physician is able to use medical services and his therapeutic advice to 
                                                 
2 There exists a broad literature on the topics of supplier-induced demand and patient’s moral hazard starting 
with the works of Evans (1974) and Pauly (1968). An overview about the problems of physician behavior and 
consumer incentives in health care is presented in McGuire (2000) and Zweifel and Manning (2000). 
  3maximize the resulting profit (cf. Gaynor (1994), p. 299ff.). The physician’s scope for profit 
maximizing activities depends crucially on the remuneration system and the existence of a 
treatment monopoly even if it is temporary limited. As regards patient’s behavior, he suffers 
from an information deficit and a lack of consumer sovereignty (cf. Ryan (1994) and Gaynor 
(1994)). The quality of the credence good medical services is not verifiable for the patient 
neither before medical treatment nor after (cf. Arrow (1963), p.  949 and Richard (1996), 
p. 201). Hence, the patient is not informed about the medical process. Therefore, he cannot 
infer the adequate therapy from the disease symptoms. Like in other service industries, 
production and consumption of the good are not separable. The treatment outcome is not 
solely determined by physician’s actions but is also influenced by the patient’s treatment 
accompanying behavior, his compliance, because in most cases the treatment would not result 
in a satisfactory outcome without patient’s cooperation. Thus, health outcome can be 
described as joint production between physician’s medical services and patient’s behavior (cf. 
Leonard and Zivin (2001), p. 2). Consequently, each actor has a discretionary scope 
concerning the actions he can make use of for his own advantage. Ma and McGuire (1997, 
p.687) include two inputs in their model of a health care production process, one that is 
patient-controlled and one that is physician-controlled. 
The adequate theoretical background for investigating the information relation between 
physician and patient is the so-called principal-agent theory (cf. Arrow (1985), Zweifel and 
Breyer (1997) and Zweifel, Lehmann and Steinmann (2002)).
3 Most of the principal-agent 
models in health economics focus solely on the physician’s behavior. Some newer approaches 
explicitly integrate the health relevant behavior or compliance of the patient and its influence 
on physician activities and health outcome into the analysis (cf. Ma and McGuire (1997), 
Leonard and Zivin (2001) and Schneider (2004)). Here, in addition to the analysis of the 
physician behavior also the patient’s health relevant behavior is important for the health 
outcome. In such a framework, the decisions of physicians and patients are correlated and 
cannot be analyzed separately. The so-called double moral hazard approach presented in 
Schneider (2004) is the theoretical basis of the following analysis. It is based on a model by 
Cooper and Ross (1985) about product care and warranties. The basic structure of the model 
is presented in figure 1. 
                                                 
3 An agency relationship is illustrated by preferences of principal and agent that fall apart and the informational 
advantage of the agent (cf. Gaynor (1994)). Besides the physician-patient relationship, there exist other 
principal-agent relations in the health care sector, e. g. between insurer and physician or between patient and 
insurer. 
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<insert figure 1 here> 
 
The model incorporates a contract and a treatment stage. At the first stage, the insurer signs an 
insurance contract with the patient and a remuneration contract with the physician or his 
association. From the insurer’s point of view, these contracts are not independent because 
changes in the remuneration contract lead to a revision of the insurance contract with the 
patient. After contracting, nature decides about the health status of the patient. If he is 
seriously ill or if he beliefs that he needs medical treatment, he visits a physician (contact 
decision); in the other case, the game ends. In contrast, the physician dominates the treatment 
stage. He chooses the adequate therapy that depends on patient’s health status, the 
remuneration systems, the chosen coinsurance rate, and the insurance premium. Nevertheless, 
not only the physician is important for the resulting health outcome but also the patient who 
influences the outcome through his health related behavior.  
One central element of the treatment stage of the model is the strategically interaction of 
physician’s medical services and patient’s compliance. In detail, one has to distinguish three 
possible cases: First, medical services and compliance are strategic independent. This means 
that a higher level of medical services has no effect on the marginal productivity of patient’s 
compliance and vice versa. Second, in the case of strategic complements the marginal 
productivity of one input factor in the medical process increases as the level of the other 
factor rises. Third, given strategic substitutes, a decrease of the marginal productivity of one 
input is the result of an increase in the other input. As a consequence, the probability of a 
recovery depends not only on the level of medical services and compliance but also on the 
kind of strategic interaction. As an example, when introducing a demand-side coinsurance, 
health outcome depends crucially on the concrete form of strategic interactions. 
On basis of this model structure, we have in the following a closer look at the determinants of 
physician visits and the health relevant behavior of the patient. It is important to note that the 
results of the treatment stage cannot be adopted straightforwardly to an empirical model. 
First, it is necessary to look at the entire health production process i.e. that besides the 
compliance of the patient his health relevant behavior without a physician visit is important, 
too. This implies that all health related activities have consequences for health status and 
  5health seeking behavior. Second, the insurance contract has an influence on the behavior of 
physician and patient, especially if we look at a demand-side coinsurance that influences the 
contact decision. Therefore, it follows that it seems necessary to extent the analysis to the 
entire health production instead of focusing only on the treatment process. 
3  Empirical analysis of the physician-patient relationship 
3.1  Basic considerations 
The empirical analysis centers around the health care triangle between physician, patient, and 
insurer (see figure 2). In all of these relationships, asymmetric information is prevalent. For 
our study, the consumption of medical services is essential and can be reflected by the 
decision to visit a physician.
4 On the one hand, the patient’s choice is up to his discretionary 
power; on the other hand, it is driven more indirectly by his own health related behavior. 
Therefore, estimation of patient’s health related behavior has to keep two things in mind: 
First, the determinants of the health relevant behavior itself and second, its influence on the 
contact decision. These two decisions are influenced by factors like socioeconomic factors, 
current health status, and the conditions of the insurance contract. 
Second, one has to consider the influence of the physician’s actions on patient’s behavior. 
Hence, the relevant question is in how far the physician determines the frequency decision 
and what the driving factors behind it are. Physicians may respond to this question by 
explaining that patient’s health status and well-being are central for their job. In addition, 
physician’s self-interest seems to be important, e.g. the influence of the remuneration system, 
income and leisure goals, and their advantages physicians take from their specialized medical 
knowledge (cf. e. g. Evans (1974) or Eggleston (1999)). A possible last influencing factor is 
the medical infrastructure. Here, the access to general practitioners, specialists, and hospitals 
plays an important role. 
 
<insert figure 2 here> 
 
                                                 
4 The structure of the decision process can be empirically tested by separating the contact from the frequency 
decision (cf. Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), Jones (2000)). 
  6On basis of the described relation between physician and patient, the following four 
hypotheses can be used as starting point for the empirical analysis of the physician-patient 
relationship in the German health care system. 
H1:  There is empirical evidence for a cooperative model of health production between 
physician and patient in the German health care system. 
The question behind this hypothesis is whether the physician’s supply of medical services is 
the driving factor for health outcome or whether there is some significant influence of 
patient’s behavior in the production of health. 
H2:  The supply of medical services influences patient’s demand for medical treatment as 
well as patient’s behavior. 
This hypothesis about the ability of physicians to determine the amount of services demanded 
by patients follows the literature on physician-induced demand and applies to the physician 
density. Moreover, it is possible that the physician has also an impact on the general behavior 
of the patient, not only with respect to health seeking but also with respect to patient’s attitude 
towards health. However, it should be mentioned that the used variable physician density, 
which is imported from the level of federal states, might not be the adequate indicator of 
health care supply because it displays only the federal average and does not show the 
differences within the states. Instead, one can think of using the physician visit as an 
explanatory variable in the equation of health behavior. However, as is shown in section 3.2, a 
model of simultaneous equations including both dependent variables as explanatory factors 
lead to inconsistent estimates. 
H3:  The health insurance system has an impact on patient’s behavior and his demand for 
medical services. 
Following the literature on moral hazard behavior, patients are consuming too much health 
care because the marginal costs of health care are too low compared to the case without 
insurance. One possibility to deal with this moral hazard behavior is to introduce a demand-
side cost-sharing (cf. Zweifel and Breyer (1997)). In Germany, the level of co-payments 
differs between the types of insurance. Hence, the status whether the patient is fully private, 
standard SHI or SHI insured with supplemental private insurance may have an impact on 
patient’s behavior. 
  7In contrast to the first three hypotheses, which deal with the specific situation in the German 
health care market, our final hypothesis refers to the applied estimation technique: 
H4:  The equation specifying the demand for medical care and the equation for patient’s 
health behavior are stochastically dependent.  
A first more formal interpretation of this hypothesis is that there is a correlation between the 
error terms of the two equations that has to be taken into account in the empirical model (see 
section 3.2). A more informal interpretation of this relationship is that the patient’s health 
behavior is also determined by general environmental factors that are not captured by the data 
but that also simultaneously influence the demand for medical care via the correlation of the 
two error terms. 
One remaining question for the empirical analysis is the measurement of health relevant 
behavior and medical services. Both variables are multidimensional constructs. Therefore, it 
is necessary to develop appropriate indicators for the empirical analysis. As regards medical 
services, the treatment expenditures or the number of physician visits are possible indicators. 
For the health relevant behavior, the situation is more complex. We construct an indicator that 
may include patient’s attitude towards health, his consumption pattern, or his sport activities.  
3.2  Estimation method 
Besides aspects that deal with the topic of choosing variables the choice of the estimation 
method is of relevance. Here, it is necessary to decide if the actions of physician and patient 
occur simultaneously or sequentially. This distinction is important if the sequence of actions 
has an impact on the result. If the health outcome does not depend on the timing structure or if 
it is not possible to sort the data with respect to the sequence of actions the simultaneous 
structure fits better. Moreover, besides this simultaneity it is necessary for the estimation 
method to account for the interdependency of the actions of physician and patient. 
Given the results of the theoretical approaches presented in chapter 2 we use an empirical 
model for simultaneous equations. The advantage of this procedure is that we are able to 
estimate two equations that seem to be independent at first view. Moreover, there might exist 
a correlation between them due to the structure of the errors. 
Starting with the dependent variables, we are in need of an estimation technique for 
qualitative dependent variables because we use binary endogenous variables as proxy for 
health relevant behavior and health care demand. Our estimation approach considers a 
  8potential endogeneity of the dependent variables. If one starts with a mutual influence of both 
















2 β2 +ε2 .
 
 







⎠ Prob y1 = 1 , y2 = 1 =Φ2 γ1 y2 +x
'
1 β1 ,γ2 y1 +x
'
2 β2 , ρ . (3.2)
 
 
Here, y  and y  are binary dependent variables. Equation (3.2) 1 2  gives the probability if both 
variables take the value one. The probabilities for the other cases are calculated in the same 
manner. Φ2 is the bivariate normal conditional distribution function. Unfortunately, the above 
model is not consistent and not estimable in the presented form (Maddala (1983), p. 117f.). 
One possible modification of the approach is to calculate the probabilities for two binary 
dependent variables if γ1=0 holds. With respect to this problem, part two of hypothesis 2 that 
is based on the influence of medical supply on patient’s behavior is not testable in our 
specification. 
The resulting model is a recursive bivariate probit model (cf. Maddala (1983) or Greene 
(2003)).



















E ε1 |x1 ,x2 =E ε2 |x1 ,x2 =0 , (3.3)
 
Var ε1 |x1 ,x2 = Var ε2 |x1 ,x2 =1 ,
 
Cov ε1 ,ε2 |x1 ,x2 = ρ .
 
 
                                                 
5 There exist other models using a binary dependent variable for the first equation and a continuous dependent 
variable for the second equation (cf. Maddala (1983)).  
6 A model in which the vector of explaining variables is different in both equations can be characterized as a 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model (cf. StataCorp (2001), p. 139). 
  9Here, the parameter ρ is the covariance between the error terms. It measures in how far the 
unobserved factors influence both, the health relevant behavior, and the physician visit. Both 
equations in (3.3) can be estimated separately as single probit models but the estimated 
coefficients are inefficient because the correlation between the error terms is neglected. Only 
in the case that the error terms ε  and ε 1 2 are independent (ρ is not significantly different from 
zero) it is possible to deal with the above model as two independent equations (cf. Maddala 
(1983), p. 123). Knapp and Seaks (1998) provide a Hausman test for the exogeneity of a 
dummy variable in a probit model. Using the same model structure as above, they show that 
the difference between the joint estimation of both equations and the separate estimation of 
two individual probit models is controlled by the parameter ρ. The estimation of model (3.3) 
then provides an estimate of the asymptotic standard error of ρ ˆ . Therefore, it is possible to 
compute the statistic   to test the hypothesis H ρ ρ = ˆ / ˆ s z 0 : ρ=0. The square of this value z 
converges to a χ
2 distribution with the same limits as the proposed Hausman test. 
The equations in (3.3) form a recursive, simultaneous equation system. Greene analyzes a 
two-step approach proposed by Burnett, in which the reduced form equation is estimated by 
maximum likelihood methods (cf. Greene (1998)). The predicted values from the first 
equation then enter the maximum likelihood estimation of structural equation in the second 
step. However, it is possible to show that this approach does not account for a possible 
correlation of the error terms. Instead, we use a bivariate probit model to estimate the 
equations above. Here, the endogeneity can be ignored in formulating the log-likelihood. To 
start with, the joint probability of an outcome y =y 1 2=1 can be written in terms of the 
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Here, Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distribution. Together 
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⎠ Prob y1 =0 , y2 = 0 =Φ2 -x
'
1 β1 , -x
'
2 β2 , ρ .
 
 
These are the probabilities that enter the likelihood function for the bivariate probit model (cf. 
Greene (1998), p. 295). Therefore, the problem of endogeneity in the second equation is not 
relevant for the calculation of the log-likelihood function and in contrast to a linear regression 
model, the simultaneity can be neglected (cf. Greene (2003), p. 715). 
With respect to the panel structure of the data, the above model has to be adjusted. To deal 
with individual heterogeneity of the respondents, a random effects specification is required. 
For the bivariate probit model for panel data, we use a generalization of a random effects 
model proposed by Greene. Since the random effects specification of a bivariate probit model 
is nontrivial, the specification used here applies to a random parameters approach proposed by 
Greene (2001). The advantage of this specification is that in general, all variables including 
the constant term can be treated as random variables. In our specific case, we use a 
specification where only the constant terms of the two equations are assumed to be random. In 
effect, this implementation of a random parameters model is equivalent to a random effects 
bivariate probit model for panel data.
7







⎠ Prob yit = 1 |xit ,β i =F β
'
i xit ,i = 1 , … ,N,t=1 , … ,T, (3.7)
 
 
with F(·) as the normal distribution. The underlying specification of the coefficients vector is: 
β i =β +Δ zi +Γ vi ,  
 
 
                                                 
7 For an application of a random parameters approach see Greene (2002a), Greene (2004) and Björnsen (2004). 
  11where β is the vector of unconditional means. Furthermore, Δ is a matrix of unknown location 
parameters, zi is a vector of individual characteristics (heterogeneity term), Γ a matrix of 
unknown variance parameters and vi the vector of random latent individual effects, with a 
mean of zero. 
In the general random parameters model, it is assumed that parameters are randomly 
distributed across individuals with possibly heterogeneous mean and variance:  
E β i |zi =β +Δ zi ,  
 
Var β i |zi = ∑ .  
 
 
The second term is optional which means that the parameter matrix Δ=0. In this case, if the 
mean of the coefficient βi is constant, the parameter in view is non-random. In our estimation 
of a bivariate probit model, we assume that all parameters are non-random except for the 
constant terms in both equations. In this formulation, the random parameters model is 






















it ∀ i,t.  
 
 j Here, y it is the binary dependent variable of equation j.
8 The vector β
 j is the coefficient 
vector that is constant over individuals and time. The heterogeneity between individuals is 
represented by the parameter α
 j that is random over individuals and ε
 j
i it is the true 
disturbance. The parameters α
 j
i are binormally distributed with a zero mean and a standard 
deviation equal to σαj. Moreover, we allow the random parameters to be correlated with a 
correlation coefficient of θ. For the true error terms εit, the same assumptions are made as in 
equation  (3.3): the standard deviation is equal to one and the covariance or correlation 
between these error terms is ρ. Furthermore, there exists no correlation between the true 
errors and the individual heterogeneity parameters. The estimation is carried out using 
LIMDEP Version 8.0. For the random effects bivariate probit model, we use the random 
parameter specification with only constant terms as random. Moreover, instead of the random 
draws we use the Halton sequence for the simulated maximum likelihood to reduce the 
number of draws and the computation time. 
                                                 
8 The recursive effect of y
 1 and y
 2 in the second equation of (3.8) is neglected here. 
  12The estimation of a recursive bivariate probit model is carried out using simulated maximum 
likelihood techniques and requires some consideration for the identification of the model 
parameters. Maddala (cf. 1983, p.  123) shows that given the model in equation (3.3) the 
number of parameters to be estimated is larger than the number of probabilities, even if 
constant terms are the only exogenous variables. In this case, the parameters in the structural 
equation are not identified. Maddala proposes that at least one variable in x1 is not included in 
x2. On the contrary, x  may contain variables not included in x 2 1. In contrast to this common 
approach, Wilde 2000 states that Maddala concentrates on the special case of constant 
exogenous regressors and only for this case the argumentation is valid. Consequently, the 
parameters of the model are identified if there exists at least one varying exogenous regressor. 
According to Wilde, there is sufficient variation in the data to identify the parameters even in 
this simple case. He concludes that for the standard case with varying exogenous regressors 
the full rank of the matrix is sufficient for identification purposes (cf. Wilde (2000), p: 311). 
The identification problem and the choice of exclusion restrictions is discussed in more detail 
in section 4. 
3.3  Previous studies 
Literature about applications of bivariate probit models in health economics is scarce. One of 
the first studies is Holly et al. (1998) who use a simultaneous two equation probit model to 
estimate the effect of supplemental health insurance on health care utilization. They find that 
the choice of supplemental health insurance has a positive effect on the probability of a 
hospital stay. Knaus and Nuscheler (2002) apply a bivariate probit model to the question of 
the impact of health status on changing the insurer. They analyze company-based sickness 
funds in the German SHI System after introducing competition between insurers and a risk-
adjustment scheme. In contrast to the specification presented in section 3.2, they use a two-
stage procedure to control for the endogeneity of the health status. First, the health status 
equation is estimated using an ordinary probit model and second, the fitted values from the 
first equation are inserted in the second equation. Again, a simple probit model estimates this 
structural equation. Thereby, they assume that the error terms of both equations are 
uncorrelated. 
Jones, Koolman and von Doorslaer (2005) estimate the impact of private health insurance on 
the use of specialist visits using the first four waves of the European Community Household 
Panel. They carry out the analysis for various European countries using different estimation 
methods. One of them is a FIML estimator of a bivariate probit model. It is worth mentioning 
  13that insurance coverage in the previous year influences the probability of a specialist visit in 
the subsequent year in order to avoid a simultaneity bias. They find that the existence of a 
private health insurance plan increases the probability of visiting a specialist. The analysis of 
Fabbri, Monfardini and Radice (2004) focuses on the hospital choice and the case of cesarean 
section delivery. Moreover, they present different tests of exogeneity in the bivariate probit 
model. They find evidence that the exogeneity status should be evaluated using a likelihood 
ratio test. Balia and Jones (2005) estimate a recursive multivariate probit model to analyze the 
effect of lifestyle and self-assessed health on mortality, which can be viewed as an extension 
of the bivariate model. 
3.4  Data 
The data we use are two waves from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), the 
years 2002 and 2004.
9 Together with these data, we make use of the variable physician 
density in each of the German federal states. Our dependent variables are the health relevant 
behavior of the patient and the physician visit as a proxy for the usage of medical services. 
Patient’s health relevant behavior is a multidimensional construct that has the character of a 
latent variable. It is therefore necessary to construct an adequate indicator that covers the 
various aspects behind the variable health relevant behavior. On the one hand, we use 
indicators like smoking and drinking which can be interpreted as non-medical determinants of 
individual’s health. On the other hand, we use a measure for health condition like overweight 
which can be understood as indicator of the past health behavior. In the following empirical 
analysis, individual’s overweight is mapped by the body mass index (BMI) (cf. World Health 
Organization (2003), p 69). The idea behind the health behavior indicator is shown in figure 
3. Health relevant behavior is a latent variable that can be measured by the corresponding 
indicators, while other influencing factors are summarized in the disturbance term. 
 
<insert figure 3 here> 
 
                                                 
9 The data used in this publication were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. For the year 2003 no information about 
individual height and weight is available. 
  14With respect to the health relevant consumption only data about tobacco consumption are 
included in the GSOEP while other consumption patterns like alcohol drinking and specific 
health related consumption expenditures are not included in the questionnaire. Moreover, 
variables concerning sports and nutrition are only available for the year 2004. Therefore, we 
restrict ourselves to variables that are included in the years 2002 and 2004. With respect to 
tobacco consumption, the first question in the GSOEP asks generally if the respondent 
smokes or not. Second, it is asked for different kinds of smoking like cigarettes, pipes or 
cigars and how much the respondent smokes. We concentrate ourselves on the question of 
smoking or not and use the binary nature of the variable. Together with the information about 
tobacco consumption, we use the BMI to construct an indicator concerning the health relevant 
behavior. Therefore, we compute the standard BMI from the data about body height and body 
weight and adjust the BMI for an age-specific changes (cf. National Research Council (1989), 
p. 564). Recent literature gives evidence that smoking behavior in combination with heavy 
overweight increases the mortality risk for people aged less than 65 (cf Freedman et al. 
(2006)). They find that for all groups obesity and smoking behavior have an impact on all-
cause mortality. The combination of both indicators leads to a 6- to 11-fold increase in 
circulatory disease mortality for people younger than 65 years, compared to those with normal 
weight and never smokers. Even if we cannot generalize this result with respect to morbidity 
and the demand for health care, we use this information to build an indicator of adverse health 
behavior that takes the value one if the respondent is smoking and has overweight according 
to the age-adjusted BMI. 
The second endogenous variable is a proxy for the demand for medical services. Again, this 
behavior is not directly observable and therefore not included in the GSOEP dataset. Only 
some indicators for the utilization of health services are available, e.g. the numbers of 
physician visits in the last quarter, the number of overnight stays in hospital or whether the 
respondent received any treatments towards medical rehabilitation, both in the last year. Since 
hospital stays and rehabilitation measures are probably based on a different decision process 
compared to ambulatory care, we use the number of physician visits in the current year as a 
proxy for the demand for medical services.  It is important to notice that in the German SHI-
system the quarter provides the base for the accounting period in ambulatory care. Moreover, 
the GSOEP data only has questions for this period. To test the possibility that the date at 
which the interview takes place influences the results we run estimations of the model with 
10
                                                 
10 This variable does neither make any distinction between treatment and preventive visits nor between visits of a 
general practitioner and a specialist. 
  15dummy variables for each quarter but none of them had a significant effect. Since more than 
80 % of the individuals in the sample have at most one consultation during the quarter, we 
infer that multiple illness spells are a rare event. Moreover, for the majority of the patients in 
ambulatory care their illness spell seems to be well covered by the observation period, so that 
we regard the problem of a possible bias using quarterly data as being of only minor 
importance in ambulatory care. Basically, we would prefer a model combining count data 
aspects (physician visits) with aspects of binary variables (health relevant behavior). To our 
knowledge, such a model for simultaneous equations does not exist. Instead, we use binary 
indicators and therefore a bivariate probit model (cf. Maddala (1983) or Greene (2003)) for 
panel data where our indicator for physician visits takes the value one if there has been at least 
one visit in the last quarter. 
The independent variables are predisposing variables like age, age squared and cubic, gender, 
nationality, family status, and an interaction term of age and gender. The group of 
socioeconomic variables consists of variables for the household’s income position, 
educational dummy variables, and variables concerning the employment status. For the 
income position, we use the logarithm of the net household income to correct for the 
skewness of the density function. As the size of the household differs for the respondents, we 
correct for this effect using the household equivalent income. One version is the OECD 
equivalent income scale that uses relative weights for household members. The first member 
gets a weight of one, additional members of 0.5 if older than 14 years and 0.3 if younger than 
14. The household income is than divided by the sum of the individual weights. Another 
approach is to divide the income by the square root of the household size. The German 
Council of Economic Experts used both equivalence scales with the result of different 
averages but no effect on the income distribution. Here, we compute the equivalent income 
using the square root of the household size as divisor. In addition to the correction of the 
household size, we construct several interaction terms with our income variable, namely 
interaction of income with employment status. Moreover, we integrate a dummy variable for 
being very concerned about the own economic situation. Furthermore, we use three dummy 
variables for the respondent’s highest education: university degree, high school degree, and 
O-level. The latter two variables only take the value one if the respondent has not graduated 
from university or high school respectively. The employment status is included in the GSOEP 
via several variables. We use a generated variable that classifies the labor force status for all 
survey members into 11 categories and restrict ourselves to the case of being registered as 
unemployed, having a regular employment and being retired. Therefore, three dummy 
  16variables for the employment status are included and the reference scenario are those not 
seeking employment. The last variable in this section is ‘living in East Germany’ that 
indicates whether the respondent has his residence in the so called New Laender. 
Additionally, we include health and insurance variables like a hospital stay in the previous 
year, the physician density, a measure of self-assessed health, and the insurance status. The 
first health variable is an indicator for being rushed or pressed for time during the last four 
weeks. Moreover, a dummy variable for respondents legally classified as handicapped is 
included. Self-assessed health is a variable with five categories ranging from very good to 
bad. The first four categories are transformed into dummy variables and the status bad serves 
as reference case. Additionally, strong worries about health are included in the dataset. As 
regards insurance status, we distinguish between respondents having supplemental, private 
and no health insurance. The standard SHI contract serves a reference scenario. In Germany, 
almost 90 % of the population is covered by this system, only 9 % have a full private health 
insurance (incl. self-employed and high earning voluntarily insured). The private health 
insurers provide full insurance and supplementary coverage for SHI-insured individuals. 
Private insurers have also been not very successful in containing health care costs. This is 
partly due to existing forms of cross-subsidization of SHI-sickness funds by private health 
insurers and partly to health expenditures effects of the ongoing aging process combined with 
the possibilities of the technological-medical progress. Present health reform legislation tries 
to make opting out of SHI into private health insurance more difficult. 
Since information on the state of residency is available, we are able to include the physician 
density at the state level. The physician density variable can proxy both demand response 
(higher physician density lowers opportunity costs of visiting a doctor) and supplier-induced 
response (it is essentially up to the physician to determine the intensity of treatment once the 
patient has decided to contact a physician). An overview over the variables in the dataset is 
given in table 1. 
 
<insert table 1> 
 
  174  Estimation results 
Overall, the dataset consists of 8153 individuals for two years (16306 observations). First, if 
one takes a look at the descriptive statistics it is obvious that 61.8 % of the respondents have 
visited a physician in the last quarter on average. 10.9 % of the individuals claim to smoke 
and simultaneously have age-adjusted overweight. Therefore, we state that their health related 
behavior is inadequate (cf. table 2). 
The average age of the sample is 46.9 years whereas only adults both employed and not 
working are included in our dataset. Overall, 51.7 % are female, 27.1 % do not live together 
with a partner and 10.9 % are not German. Concerning the socioeconomic variables, it is 
evident that 6.1 % are unemployed at the time the survey was conducted, 58.8 % have a 
regular employment and 10.9 are already retired. The average net equivalent income of a 
household is about 1500 Euro per month. Regarding the education of the individuals, 17.4 % 
tell a university or comparable degree as their highest certificate, 10.2 % have only a high-
school graduation, and 32.4 % a first public examination in secondary school. The remaining 
40 % of the respondents possess another kind of certificate or they did not graduate from any 
kind of school. The fraction of people living in East Germany is 31.6 % in the dataset, which 
means that they are overrepresented compared to the fraction of about 20 % in the whole 
population. 
 
<insert table 2> 
 
For the health and insurance variables, it follows that less than 5 % answered the question 
whether they had always stress or hurries during the last four weeks with yes. For the 
disability status, 12.4  % are legally classified as handicapped and about 12  % of the 
respondents stayed at least once in hospital the year before. More than 80  % of the 
respondents rate their own health status as satisfactory or better, only 14 % as poor and less 
than 4  % as bad. The physician density in Germany in the years 2002 and 2004 has an 
average of 35.6. This means that there are about 36 physicians per 10,000 residents. Only 
9.8  % of the respondents in the sample are fully privately insured and just 9.0  % have 
supplemental private insurance. Less than 1 % claim to have no insurance coverage at all. 
  18These low values correspond to the actual levels in Germany mentioned above. This is a 
result of the dominance of the compulsory SHI that covers more than 90 % of the population. 
The recursive effect between the two equations is modeled as follows: We assume that the 
individual adverse health behavior has an impact on the decision to visit a physician. This 
health behavior reflects patient’s long-run preferences towards his health status, his 
perception of his behavior and the intertemporal consequences of his actions. A physician 
visit does not necessarily lead to a change in the corresponding health behavior of the patient. 
As an example, one could think of preventive visits with no clinical findings and no 
therapeutic recommendation. Therefore, we neglect a possible endogeneity of the variable 
physician visit and model the recursive effects so that individual adverse health behavior is 
causal to a physician visit. 
To identify the model parameters, we estimate different specifications and compare the 
corresponding fit using two measures of information criteria, the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian (or Schwarz) information criterion (BIC) (cf. Long (1997) and 
Greene (2002b)). Both, the Akaike information criterion and the Bayesian criterion make use 
of the log-likelihood of the estimated model.
11 They represent the trade-off between goodness 
of the estimation, given by the log-likelihood and parsimony of the specification, which is 
given by the number of estimated parameters. Compared to the AIC, the BIC puts more 
weight on the parsimony of the models. The information criteria are often used to compare 
different model specifications. The model with the lowest value of the AIC or BIC is chosen 
as the preferred one (cf. Verbeek (2000), p. 54 and 254). In addition, we use a likelihood ratio 
test to analyze the influence of the imposed restrictions. 
We compare four different specifications concerning the exclusion restrictions. First, we 
follow the approach proposed by Wilde that due to the variation in the data no exclusion of 
variables is necessary. Second, we exclude the variable stress in the equation for the physician 
visit. The idea behind this is that stress only indirect affects the probability of a visit through 
the health relevant behavior. Third, the variable economic worries is added the next excluded 
variable. Here, we argue that the comprehensive coverage of the German health care system 
removes economic pressure from those in need of medical care. Finally, we exclude the 
variable for living in Eastern Germany for the physician equation. The reason is that the 
                                                 
11 The Akaike Information Criterion is defined as AIC=(-2LogL+2K)/N and the Bayesian Information Criterion 
as BIC=-2LogL+KLog(N), where K is the number of parameters in the Model and N the number of observations. 
  19variable physician density already captures regional differences between east and west. The 
measures of fit for the different specification are presented in table 3. 
 
<insert table 3> 
 
It is obvious that the presented measures of fit are relatively close together. Moreover, the 
order of the criteria is the same for both, AIC and BIC. The preferred model III. in table 3 
excludes the variables stress, economic worries, and east in the equation for the physician 
visits. Here, the values of the information criteria show the lowest values. This result is 
important with respect to the choice between the specifications of Maddala and Wilde. 
According to our results, the Maddala approach that uses exclusion restrictions is preferable 
because of the better fit given by the information criteria. Furthermore, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of differences between the restricted and unrestricted model using a likelihood 
ratio test. Apart from these specifications issues, the estimation results of the different models 
are comparable, implying small differences in the estimated parameters and standard errors.  
The estimation results are obtainable from table 4. The first two columns give the results for 
the adverse health behavior equation and the second two columns for the physician equation. 
For each equation, the first column shows the estimated coefficient and the second column the 
related z-value of the parameter, the ratio of estimated coefficient and estimated standard 
deviation. The estimation sample consists of 16306 individuals, 8153 in each year. As regards 
the estimation, we exclude the three variables stress, economic worries, and east from the 
second equation. To test for an effect of the supply of physician services on the demand of 
medical care, we add the variable physician density to the second equation. In addition, we 
introduce a dummy for the year 2004, which measures the individual time invariant effect. 
Starting with the adverse health behavior equation, the coefficient for the year 2004 is not 
significant. Estimation results show that health relevant behavior depends positively on the 
individual’s age. The effect is significant at the 1  % level. The quadratic age term is 
significant negative and the cubic term significant positive. However, the cubic age term has 
an influence on the relationship between age and adverse health behavior not until the very 
high age classes. This means that for the age classes in the sample, we observe the well-
known inverse u-shaped relationship for the relevant age in the sample between 17 and 99 
  20years. Adverse health behavior in terms of a combination of smoking and overweight reaches 
its maximum around the age of 37 years. If we look at the gender variable, the significant 
negative effect indicates that women’s health behavior is better compared to men. This effect 
occurs because differences in smoking behavior between women and men (27.6 % to 36.6 %) 
whereas the differences in the age-adjusted BMI in the normal range are relatively small 
(48.6  % to 51.2  %). The interaction variable between female and age is not significant. 
Foreigners show a worse health related behavior, which might be related to different living 
habits. The effect for singles is not significant at all. 
The unemployment variable shows no significant effect whereas the dummy variables for 
working and retirement status have a significant positive coefficient. This result indicates that 
in contrast to people that do not seek an employment, those in the labor force and those 
already retired are more eligible for unhealthy behavior. For the working group, this may 
indicate a negative impact of a high workload. The equivalent household income has a 
negative effect as well as a better education does. All three educational dummies show a 
negative effect with respect to the reference case, i.e. to a lower school graduation certificate. 
Moreover, for the estimated model we find a gradient in people’s education implying that the 
probability of an adverse health behavior decreases with a better education. In addition to the 
effect of the household income, people facing strong economic worries tend to have a higher 
probability of an adverse health behavior. The three interaction terms between income and 
labor force status show no significant impact on the probability of an adverse health behavior. 
Respondents who live in Eastern Germany surprisingly exhibit a better health behavior 
pointing to the fact that even after more than 10 years of reunification there are still 
behavioral differences between the two parts of Germany. 
 
<insert table 4> 
 
In the group of the health and insurance variables, for handicapped respondents a significant 
negative impact is observable. This means that respondents facing severe health problems 
care more about their health. Moreover, people facing stress regularly do not show an adverse 
health behavior compared to those without stress. A hospital stay in the last year leads to a 
worse health related behavior. The coefficient is significant at the 1  % level. All health 
  21dummy variables show a significant negative influence on the adverse health behavior except 
for the poor health status dummy. The interpretation is that a self-assessed health better than 
poor goes along with a better behavior. Moreover, we observe no significant effect for the 
health worries. There is no significant difference between standard SHI insured people and 
respondents with supplemental private insurance, but a significant difference for people with 
private insurance or no coverage. The last group shows a higher probability for an adverse 
health behavior whereas the full private insurance negatively influences the probability. All 
things considered, these results support hypothesis 3 about the influence of the health 
insurance system on patient’s health behavior even if we control for the health status of the 
individuals in our sample. A possible explanation is that there exist differences in the benefits 
catalogue and the level of co-payments between an individual in the SHI system and an 
individual that is fully private insured. 
The estimation results of the second equation (physician visit) are presented in the columns 
three and four of table 4. With the exception of the exclusion restrictions, all variables of the 
first equation are used as explanatory factors. In addition, the dependent variable of the first 
equation, the binary variable for adverse health behavior is included. The inclusion of this 
endogenous variable is characteristic for a recursive bivariate probit model. This unhealthy 
behavior has a positive effect on the probability of a physician visit. In other words, if the 
respondent shows a bad health related behavior this goes along with a higher probability for a 
physician visit. It seems plausible that individuals who do not care much about their health 
status visit doctors more regularly rather in need of medical treatment than seeking 
prevention. This result gives weak evidence that patient’s health related behavior is one 
important factor for the demand of medical care and emphasizes the relevance of the 
cooperative view of health production (hypothesis 1). As regards health politics, it follows 
that future health care reforms should center more on the patient and his health relevant 
behavior, which can be seen as a driving factor of future demand for medical care. 
The dummy for the year 2004 shows a significant negative sign. This can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the 2004 health care reform act that introduced for the SHI system a co-payment of 
10 Euro for each quarter of the year with a visit. This resulted in a lower number of physician 
visits in the year 2004. All three age terms are significant and result in a u-shaped relationship 
between the age of the patient and the probability of a physician visit given the age between 
17 and 99 years. Again, the impact of the cubic age term is only relevant for age classes 
beyond 100 years. One possible explanation is the co-morbidity of older patients. The gender 
  22variable shows a strong significant positive effect but the coefficient for the interaction term is 
significantly negative. The latter implies that women demand less medical services than men 
with an increasing age do, a result also found in German risk adjustment data or in Gilleskie 
and Mroz (2004) who analyze health expenditures for women and men at different ages. 
Overall, physician visits reach its minimum at the age of 24 year for men and 36 years for 
women. Individuals without a partner show a different behavior compared to individuals with 
a partner but the coefficient is only significant at the 10 % level. Foreigners tend to visit a 
physician with a lower probability than Germans do. One explanation for the negative 
coefficient may be a language problem for this population group. 
With the exception of the variables for economic worries, stress and east, we use the same set 
of socioeconomic variables as in the health behavior equation. The significant negative 
coefficient for individuals with regular employment supports the assumption of higher 
opportunity costs of time for this group. Interestingly, we observe the same effect for 
unemployed respondents. Retired individuals do not differ in their demand for a physician 
visit from the reference group. The household income has a significant positive effect.
12 
Having the comprehensive coverage against health risks in Germany in mind, this positive 
effect is not to be expected. About 90 % of the German population is covered in the Statutory 
Health Insurance where only contributions are income related but benefits are not related to 
income and given in kind. The interaction term of regularly employment and income has a 
significant positive effect stating that those employees with a high family income visit a 
physician more often than those with lower incomes do. The educational dummies all show 
the same positive effect stating that the demand for medical services depends positively on the 
achieved qualification. Moreover, we find a gradient in the different qualifications implying 
that the probability of a physician visit increases with a higher educational level.  
Considering the group of health and insurance variables, it is not surprising that handicapped 
persons are more likely to visit a physician and that a hospital stay in the previous year leads 
to a higher probability of a physician visit in the current year, indicating a higher demand for 
aftercare or post-operative treatments. As expected, all dummy variables for the self-assessed 
health have a significant and negative influence indicating that people who suppose to have a 
bad health status seek medical care more likely than other people do. We observe the same 
effect for strong health worries. The variable physician density per state is positive and 
                                                 
12 This corresponds with the effect of the income in the Grossman model where a higher income leads to a higher 
consumption of medical services (cf. Grossman (1972), p. 243). 
  23significant at the 1 % level. This confirms to our first economic intuition that a better supply 
of medical services leads to a higher demand (hypothesis 2). Since we do not distinguish 
between a contact and a frequency decision, a significant positive impact of the variable 
physician density should not only be interpreted as supplier-inducement because it captures 
both, demand and supplier response (cf. Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), p. 356). The insurance 
parameters show different results. A supplemental private insurance increases the probability 
of a physician visit while it is reduced if the individual is fully private insured. An explanation 
for the first effect is that supplemental insurance enhances the benefits catalogue or reduces 
the co-payments one has to bear. Therefore, medical services will be relatively cheaper. The 
lower demand of fully private insured individuals may have its cause in the existence of co-
payments for medical services that are higher than for standard SHI insured individuals.
13 
Additionally, people who claim to have no insurance tend to visit a physician with a lower 
probability. These results point to the relevance of hypothesis 3 stating an impact of the health 
insurance system on patient’s health behavior and the demand for medical services. 
Finally, we have a short look at the error structure and the different measures of fit at the 
bottom of table 4. The covariance parameter ρ has the value -0.1355. A χ² test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the parameter does not differ from zero. This result implies that the two 
equations are not independent and that two single probit estimates would have led to 
inefficient standard errors, which supports hypothesis 4. The unobserved factors that influence 
both dependent variables have different effects in the two equations. If we interpret one factor 
as the propensity to take risks then the negative covariance parameter states that an individual 
with a higher preference for risky activities has a higher probability of an adverse health 
behavior and a lower probability of visiting a physician.  
There exist several measures for the goodness-of-fit for the estimation. First, the McFadden 
pseudo-R² measure and second, the Akaike and Bayesian (or Schwarz) information criterion 
(AIC and BIC) that were already used to compare the different identification assumptions. 
Generally, the McFadden-R² is a kind of “likelihood-ratio index” (Long (1997), p. 104) that 
informs about the relation of the likelihood of the estimated model and the likelihood of the 
restricted constant-only model. An unambiguous interpretation is only possible for the case of 
the McFadden-R² equal to zero because none of the estimated coefficients then differs from 
zero. In contrast to this, the measure never reaches the value of one. Moreover, it is not 
                                                 
13 Another interpretation of this result is that the private insured individuals represent better risks compared to 
members of the SHI. 
  24possible to give a comprehensible interpretation for values between zero and one. Despite 
this, the measure is useful for comparing the goodness-of-fit of different models. Given the 
results presented in table 4, we have a value for the McFadden-R² of 0.173, for the adjusted 
McFadden-R² of 0.168, for the AIC of 1.442010, and for the BIC of 23998.47, which are used 
to decide on the model specification (see table 3). 
To conclude, our findings support the view that the health related behavior of the patient and 
the probability of a physician visit are dependent decision processes and the estimation of the 
recursive model gives incidence that the patient’s adverse health behavior has a positive 
impact on the demand for medical services. In addition, this result also emphasizes the 
increasing importance of the so-called patient empowerment. A patient with more power or 
more information about the consequences of his individual health related behavior can play a 
more substantial part in the health care triangle between insurer, physician, and patient. 
Consequently, future health care reforms should put more weight on the patient, his behavior, 
and his interaction with other agents in the health care system. With respect to the relationship 
between therapeutic and preventive measures, a better health relevant behavior does not 
necessarily lead to fewer physician visits since the importance of preventive contacts will 
increase at the expense of curative visits. As a consequence, one can not expect decreasing 
health care expenditures in the near future even if the importance of the individual health 
relevant behavior will increase and therapeutic care is substituted by preventive care.  
5  Conclusion 
The importance of the physician-patient relationship for the health care market is beyond 
controversy. Most theoretical work is done in a principal-agent framework, dealing with 
moral hazard problems. Recent work emphasizes a two-sided asymmetric information 
relationship between physician and patient. In contrast to most work looking only at the 
physician’s perspectives, our paper concentrates on the patient’s view. We look at patient’s 
behavior and his impact on health and health care demand.  
Based on evidence from the German health care system and on results of a double moral 
hazard model, we formulate four hypotheses to test the physician-patient relationship. Data 
basis is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a representative longitudinal study of 
private households in Germany. We use the two years 2002 and 2004 to estimate a recursive 
bivariate probit model for panel data. Dependent variables are the probability of a physician 
visit and an index of patient’s health related behavior. The applied recursive bivariate probit 
  25model allows considering the simultaneous decision of individual health related behavior and 
physician consultation. The set of independent variables includes predisposing and socio-
economic variables as well as variables concerning health status, type of health insurance and 
living conditions. 
Estimation results give some support for the four hypotheses. First, we find weak evidence 
that patient’s health related behavior is an important factor for the demand of medical care, 
which emphasizes the relevance of the cooperative view of health production, which would be 
a new approach to health care pointing to more self-responsibility of the patient. Second, a 
better supply of medical services leads to a higher demand for a physician visit. However, it is 
not possible to distinguish between a contact and a frequency decision in the data so that a 
significant positive impact of the variable physician density could be interpreted as either 
demand or supplier response. Third, the design of the health insurance system has an impact 
on patient’s health behavior and on the demand for medical services. With respect to future 
health care reforms, especially different cost-sharing models for SHI insured are of interest, 
which are up to now not allowed for this group of insured. Fourth, in our recursive bivariate 
probit model, the patient’s health relevant behavior has a significant positive influence on the 
probability of a physician visit stating that physician consultation and health relevant behavior 
are not stochastically independent. This means that in addition to the physician’s influence on 
health care demand, patient’s characteristics and health related behavior are important for a 
physician consultation and therefore for health outcome.  
One conclusion of our empirical findings is that existing literature underestimates the 
patient’s role in the health care market with respect to the demand for physician services. 
Therefore, future health policy should concentrate more on the patient’s needs and behavior. 
It is important to note that a better health relevant behavior does not necessarily lead to fewer 
physician visits since the importance of preventive contacts will increase at the expense of 
curative visits. Therefore, one cannot expect health care expenditures to decrease in the near 
future even if governments strengthen the role of patients and their individual health relevant 
behavior. 
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Figure 2:  Influencing factors of the medical decision process 
 




























measured by the body 
mass index (BMI) 
ε 
 
  32Table 1:  Description of variables in the dataset 
dependent variables 
physician  physician visit in the last quarter yes/no 
adverse health behavior  smoker and age-adjusted overweight yes/no 
predisposing variables 
age  age in years 
age²/100 age  squared/100 
age³/1000 age  cubic/1000 
female  1 = female, 0 = male 
female*age  interaction gender and age 
single  not living together with a partner yes/no 
foreign  nationality not German yes/no 
socioeconomic variables 
unemployed unemployed  yes/no 
employment  regular employment yes/no 
pension retired  yes/no 
income  Log equivalent household net income in 1000 € 
unempl.*income  interaction unemployment and income 
working*income  interaction regular employment and income 
pension*income interaction retired and income 
university  university degree yes/no 
high school  general qualification for university entrance yes/no 
O-level  first public examination in secondary school yes/no 
economic worries  strong worries about own economic situation yes/no 
east  living in Eastern Germany 
health and insurance variables 
stress  always stress or hurries in the last 4 weeks yes/no 
handicap handicap  /  physically challenged yes/no 
hospital hospital  stay  in last year yes/no 
health  very good  health status very good yes/no  
  good  health status good yes/no 
 satisfactory health  status satisfactory yes/no 
  poor  health status poor yes/no 
  bad  health status bad yes/no 
health worries  strong worries about own health status  
physician density  physicians per 10.000 inhabitants per state 
supplemental insurance  private supplemental insurance yes/no 
private health insurance  fully private insured yes/no 
no insurance  no health insurance yes/no 
 






physician  0.618  0.486 0 1 
adverse health 
behavior 
0.109  0.311 0 1 
predisposing  variables     
age  46.891  16.561 17 99 
age²/100 24.310  16.627  2  98 
age³/1000 142.548  138.821  4  970 
female 0.517  0.500 0 1 
female*age 24.386  26.531  0  99 
single  0.271  0.445 0 1 
foreign 0.109  0.311 0 1 
socioeconomic variable     
unemployed  0.061  0.240 0 1 
employment  0.588  0.492 0 1 
pension  0.109  0.311 0 1 
income  7.322  0.428 4.749 9.314 
unempl.*income 0.427  1.673  0  8.353 
working*income 4.367  3.667  0  9.314 
pension*income 0.784  2.248  0  9.311 
economic  worries  0.234  0.423 0 1 
university  0.174  0.379 0 1 
high  school  0.102  0.303 0 1 
O-level 0.324  0.468 0 1 
east  0.316  0.465 0 1 
health and insurance variables       
stress  0.046  0.209 0 1 
handicap  0.124  0.330 0 1 
hospital  0.119  0.324 0 1 
health  very  good  0.071  0.257 0 1 
  good  0.408  0.492 0 1 
  satisfactory  0.344  0.475 0 1 
  poor  0.142  0.349 0 1 
  bad  0.033  0.180 0 1 
health  worries  0.178  0.383 0 1 
physician  density  35.570  4.782 28.409 54.945 
supplemental 
insurance 
0.090  0.286 0 1 
private health 
insurance 
0.098  0.297 0 1 
no  insurance  0.005  0.074 0 1 
 
  34Table 3:  Comparison of different exclusion restrictions 







AIC  1.442165 1.442076 1.442010 1.442228 
BIC  24016.41 24007.25 23998.47 24025.97 
LR test  I.-IV.: 0.14  II.-IV.: 0.88  III.-IV.: 2.48   
χ²(1)= 3.84  χ²(2)= 5.99  χ²(3)= 7.81 
 
  35Table 4:  Estimation results recursive bivariate probit model 
  adverse health behavior  physician visit 
 coefficient  z-value  coefficient  z-value 
adverse health behavior    0.2143  4.40*** 
predisposing variables 
2004 0.0203  0.76***  -2.0421  -50.80*** 
age 0.1553  11.21***  -0.0919  -6.07*** 
age²/100 -0.2466  -8.77***  0.2201  7.44*** 
age³/1000 0.0064  3.43***  -0.0078  -4.25*** 
female -0.7401  9.95***  2.7127  29.89*** 
female*age -0.0002  0.13***  -0.0321  -17.66*** 
single -0.0055  -0.19***  -0.0571  -1.65*** 
foreign 0.1316  3.59***  -0.2089  -4.80*** 
socioeconomic variables 
unemployed -0.7460  -0.863***  -2.0714  -1.99*** 
employment 1.2008  2.00***  -2.2386  -3.57*** 
pension 1.4368  1.68***  0.3652  0.42*** 
income -0.3139  -4.30***  0.1746  2.31*** 
unempl.*income 0.1451  1.18***  0.2046  1.38*** 
working*income -0.1326  -1.60***  0.2305  2.68*** 
pension*income -0.1846  -1.54***  -0.1000  -0.82*** 
economic worries  0.1578  5.35***  -    -   
university -0.6163  -16.54***  0.4769  11.13*** 
high school  -0.3503  -8.33***  0.4320  8.72*** 
O-level -0.2459  -8.68***  0.1708  4.98*** 
east  -0.0487  -1.79***  -   -  
health and insurance variables 
stress 0.0264  0.50***  -    -   
handicap -0.2720  -6.08***  1.2265  22.43*** 
hospital 0.1277  3.24***  0.6856  14.52*** 
health very  good  -0.8632  -8.66***  -3.0923  -22.30*** 
   good  -0.1601  -1.85*** -2.2795  -17.78*** 
   satisfactory  -0.1599  -1.89*** -1.3900  -11.15*** 
   poor  -0.0428  -0.50*** -0.3739  -3.00*** 
health worries  -0.0059  -0.15***  0.6392  13.91*** 
physician density  -    -    0.1441  4.92*** 
suppl. insurance  -0.0282  -0.66***  0.2327  4.88*** 
private insured  -0.0845  -2.03***  -0.3038  -6.24*** 
no insurance  0.2772  1.94***  -1.1356  -5.82*** 
mean for random 
parameter 
-1.9648 -3.30***  1.7131  2.68*** 
-0.1355  Wald test ρ = 0 (χ²) 40.67***  ρ 
Log-Likelihood -11693.71       
McFadden R²  0.173    AIC  1.442010 
McFadden R² adj  0.168    BIC  23998.47 
N  16306  n = 8153  T = 2   
        
***  significant at the 1-%-level 
**  significant at the 5-%-level 
*  significant at the 10-%-level 
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